The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
| Autor: | Marilda Sotomayor, David Pérez-Castrillo |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics Assignment game 05 social sciences Competitive price TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Competitive equilibrium Microeconomics 0502 economics and business Economics ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY Optimal matching 050206 economic theory 050207 economics Competitive rule Game theory Industrial organization Public finance Valuation (finance) |
| Zdroj: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| ISSN: | 2015-6367 |
| Popis: | Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (ECO2015-63679-P), Generalitat de Catalunya (2014SGR-142), the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and ICREA Academia. We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer-seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results concerning buyers and sellers' equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out that, by playing first, sellers are able to instigate an outcome that corresponds to the sellers' optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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