Are the better cooperators dormant or quiescent?
| Autor: | Volker Hösel, Aurélien Tellier, Johannes Müller, Thibaut Paul Patrick Sellinger |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
0106 biological sciences
0301 basic medicine Statistics and Probability Population Context (language use) Biology 010603 evolutionary biology 01 natural sciences Models Biological General Biochemistry Genetics and Molecular Biology 03 medical and health sciences Replicator equation Animals Cooperative Behavior Quantitative Biology - Populations and Evolution education Selection (genetic algorithm) Ecosystem education.field_of_study General Immunology and Microbiology Bacteria Applied Mathematics Normal-form game Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE) Fungi General Medicine Prisoner's dilemma Plants Biological Evolution 030104 developmental biology 92D10 92D25 34E20 Homogeneous Evolutionary biology FOS: Biological sciences Modeling and Simulation Dormancy General Agricultural and Biological Sciences |
| Zdroj: | Mathematical biosciences. 318 |
| ISSN: | 1879-3134 |
| Popis: | Despite the wealth of empirical and theoretical studies, the origin and maintenance of cooperation is still an evolutionary riddle. In this context, ecological life-history traits which affect the efficiency of selection may play a role despite being often ignored. We consider here species such as bacteria, fungi, invertebrates and plants which exhibit resting stages in the form of a quiescent state or a seed bank. When quiescent, individuals are inactive and reproduce upon activation, while under seed bank parents produce offspring remaining dormant for different amount of time. We assume weak frequency-dependent selection modeled using game-theory and the prisoner's dilemma (cooperation/defect) as payoff matrix. The cooperators and defectors are allowed to evolve different quiescence or dormancy times. By means of singular perturbation theory we reduce the model to a one-dimensional equation resembling the well known replicator equation, in which the gain functions are scaled with lumped parameters reflecting the time scale of the resting state of the cooperators and defectors. If both time scales are identical cooperation cannot persist in a homogeneous population. If, however, the time scale of the cooperator is distinctively different from that of the defector, cooperation may become a locally asymptotically stable strategy. Interestingly enough, in the seed bank case the cooperator needs to become active faster than the defector, while in the quiescent case the cooperator has to be slower. We use adaptive dynamics to identify situations where cooperation may evolve and form a convergent stable ESS. We conclude by highlighting the relevance of these results for many non-model species and the maintenance of cooperation in microbial, invertebrate or plant populations. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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