Central Bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?
| Autor: | Volker Nitsch, Tonny Lybek, Helge Berger |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2008 |
| Předmět: |
Inflation
Committee council governance decision making monetary policy Geldpolitik jel:E61 Welt media_common.quotation_subject committee council governance decision making monetary policy committee monetary policy Monetary economics Zentralbank decision making Entscheidung council Exchange rate Economics ddc:330 Relevance (information retrieval) 300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::332 Finanzwirtschaft E58 E52 General Environmental Science media_common Floating exchange rate Governance-Ansatz Corporate governance Monetary policy Central banks and their policies Central banks Governance committee council decision making central bank monetary fund inflation jel:E52 jel:E58 Democracy Committee E61 governance Central bank General Earth and Planetary Sciences |
| Popis: | This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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