Reference and denotation

Autor: van Rooij, R., Hansson, S.O., Hendricks, V.F.
Přispěvatelé: ILLC (FNWI), Brain and Cognition, Logic and Language (ILLC, FNWI/FGw), Faculty of Science
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
Zdroj: Introduction to Formal Philosophy, 289-296
STARTPAGE=289;ENDPAGE=296;TITLE=Introduction to Formal Philosophy
Introduction to Formal Philosophy ISBN: 9783319774336
Popis: According to Frege, the meaning of an expression is the description that helps language users to determine what its reference is. Natural as the view might seem, it gives rise to the conceptual problem that it presupposes that we already know the meaning of the terms used in the description (Wittgenstein, Quine), and it is empirically incorrect because ‘having a correct description in mind’ is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for successful reference (Kripke, Kaplan). Perhaps reference for at least some times is non-descriptive, and depends on context. Anaphora have a referential use as well, picking up the speaker’s referent of an earlier used indefinite description. The challenge of this view is to provide a satisfactory analysis of so-called donkey-sentences.
Databáze: OpenAIRE