Implications of government subsidy on the vaccine product R&D when the buyer is risk averse
| Autor: | Pengwen Hou, Hongshuai Han, Lei Xie |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
050210 logistics & transportation
Vaccines 021103 operations research Supply chain management Evolutionarily stable strategy Risk aversion Supply chain 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies Social benefits Transportation Subsidy 02 engineering and technology Article Microeconomics 0502 economics and business Accumulated social benefit Economics Production (economics) Business and International Management Game theory Government subsidy Civil and Structural Engineering |
| Zdroj: | Transportation Research. Part E, Logistics and Transportation Review |
| ISSN: | 1878-5794 1366-5545 |
| Popis: | Highlights • The risk sensitivity of the buyer reduces the incentives of vaccine manufacturers in R&D and production. • The per-unit production subsidy is better with a low level of risk aversion, or a high potential demand. • The more profitable per-unit subsidy may be abandoned by the government due to its instability performance. This paper analyses the choice of subsidy offered to a vaccine supply chain with a risk-averse buyer. We find that for a higher innovation effort and level of social benefits, the per-unit production subsidy is better when there is a low innovation cost coefficient, a low level of risk aversion, or a high potential demand. Otherwise, under the opposite conditions, the R&D innovation effort subsidy should be selected. Furthermore, from an evolutionary game theoretical perspective, we also present the stability performance for the subsidies, and the results show that when the manufacturer’s innovation cost coefficient is relatively low, the more profitable per-unit production subsidy may be abandoned due to its performance instability. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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