Hunger Bias or Gut Instinct? Responses to Judgments of Harm Depending on Visceral State Versus Intuitive Decision-Making
Autor: | Helen Brown, Michael J. Proulx, Danaë Stanton Fraser |
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Rok vydání: | 2020 |
Předmět: |
media_common.quotation_subject
lcsh:BF1-990 interoception 050105 experimental psychology hunger moral dilemmas 03 medical and health sciences 0302 clinical medicine Psychology 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Sensibility General Psychology Original Research media_common 05 social sciences Counterintuitive Cognition decision-making moral judgment Morality Deliberation Instinct lcsh:Psychology Framing (social sciences) Harm Social psychology 030217 neurology & neurosurgery |
Zdroj: | Frontiers in Psychology Frontiers in Psychology, Vol 11 (2020) |
ISSN: | 1664-1078 |
Popis: | Empirical investigation into the emotional and physiological processes that shape moral decision-making is vast and growing. Yet, relatively less attention has been paid to measures of interoception in morality research despite its centrality in both emotional and physiological processes. Hunger and thirst represent two everyday interoceptive states, and hunger, in particular, has been shown to be influential for moral decision-making in numerous studies. It is possible that a tendency to focus on internal sensations interoceptive sensibility (IS), as well as the emotional and physiological states associated with visceral states, could be important in the relationships between hunger, thirst, and moral judgments. This cross-sectional online research (n = 154) explored whether IS, hunger, thirst, and emotional state influenced appropriateness and acceptability judgments of harm. The moral dilemma stimuli used allowed the independent calculation of (1) people’s tendency to avoid harmful action at all costs and (2) people’s tendency to maximize outcomes that benefit the greater good. The Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) was implemented to determine whether an ability to override intuitive responses to counterintuitive problems predicted harm-based moral judgments, as found previously. Hunger bias, independent of IS and emotional state, was influential for non-profitable acceptability judgments of harmful actions. Contrary to dual-process perspectives, a novel finding was that more intuitive responses on the CRT predicted a reduced aversion to harmful actions that was indirectly associated with IS. We suggest that IS may indicate people’s vulnerability to cognitive miserliness on the CRT task and reduced deliberation of moral dilemma stimuli. The framing of moral dilemmatic questions to encourage allocentric (acceptability questions) versus egocentric perspectives (appropriateness questions) could explain the divergence between hunger bias and intuitive decision-making for predicting these judgments, respectively. The findings are discussed in relation to dual-process accounts of harm-based moral judgments and evidence linking visceral experiences to harm aversion and moral decision-making. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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