Collusion-Resistant Reputation Mechanism for Multi-Agents Systems
| Autor: | Jamal Bentahara, Babak Khosravifar, Mahsa Alishahi, Maziar Gomrokchi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Computer science media_common.quotation_subject Outcome (game theory) Microeconomics symbols.namesake Strategy multi-agent systems Risk dominance General Environmental Science media_common Implementation theory Non-cooperative game Traveler's dilemma Normal-form game Symmetric game Stochastic game ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING TheoryofComputation_GENERAL reputation Rationalizability game-theory Equilibrium selection Nash equilibrium Best response symbols Repeated game General Earth and Planetary Sciences Epsilon-equilibrium Solution concept Game theory Reputation |
| Zdroj: | ANT/MobiWIS |
| ISSN: | 1877-0509 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.procs.2011.07.025 |
| Popis: | We address the collusion problem in a reputation-driven multi-agent system where agents represent service providers, consumers, and a controller. A game structure is proposed where players are supposed rational and payoff maximizers. The main issue addressed in this paper is how to maintain a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism. We analyze the behavior of different players with respect to the strategies adopted by the opponents. We provide theoretical analysis of the game and discuss the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium along with best response analysis to identify conditions under which the players adopt truthful dominant strategies. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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