Assertion: a (partly) social speech act
| Autor: | Mitchell Green, Neri Marsili |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Neri Marsili, Mitchell Green |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
050101 languages & linguistics
Linguistics and Language 05 social sciences Assertion Felicity conditions Proposition Performative utterance Commit 050105 experimental psychology Language and Linguistics Epistemology Artificial Intelligence Component (UML) 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Content (Freudian dream analysis) Psychology Counterexample Assertion Speech act theory Performatives Truth Commitment Linguistic Normativity |
| Popis: | In a series of articles (Pagin, 2004, 2009), Peter Pagin has argued that assertion is not a social speech act, introducing a method (which we baptize ‘the P-test’) designed to refute any account that defines assertion in terms of its social effects. This paper contends that Pagin's method fails to rebut the thesis that assertion is social. We show that the P-test is both unreliable (because it overgenerates counterexamples) and counterproductive (because it ultimately provides evidence in favor of some social accounts). Nonetheless, we contend that assertion is not fully social. We defend an intermediate view according to which assertion is only a partly social speech act: assertions both commit the speaker to a proposition (a social component) and present their propositional content as true (a non-social component). The upshot is that assertion is in some important respect social, although it cannot be defined solely in terms of its social effects. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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