Selection of public servants into politics
| Autor: | Alois Stutzer, Thomas Braendle |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Attractiveness
Economics and Econometrics Korruption Parliament Arbeitsplatzwechsel media_common.quotation_subject corruption political representation Public administration incompatibility government consumption Politics D72 Political science 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration ddc:330 050207 economics Ineligibility media_common Political selection public servants incompatibility political representation corruption government consumption business.industry 05 social sciences Public sector jel:D72 Parlament Legislature public servants Öffentlicher Dienst political selection compensation of politicians K39 0506 political science Neue politische Ökonomie jel:K39 Public service business |
| Zdroj: | Selection of Public Servants into Politics |
| DOI: | 10.5451/unibas-ep61066 |
| Popis: | Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns about conflicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these rules affect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public servants in 76 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there are seven percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict regime is in force. Supplementary evidence based on IV estimations shows that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption, but not correlated with government effectiveness. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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