A machine-checked proof of security for AWS key management service

Autor: Vitor Pereira, José B. Almeida, Benjamin Grégoire, Pierre-Yves Strub, Serdar Tasiran, Ernie Cohen, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Bernardo Portela, Matthew J. Campagna
Přispěvatelé: Universidade do Minho, Universidade do Porto, Institute IMDEA Software [Madrid], Amazon Web Services [Seattle] (AWS), Mathematical, Reasoning and Software (MARELLE), Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM), Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria), Sûreté du logiciel et Preuves Mathématiques Formalisées (STAMP), Département d'informatique de l'École polytechnique (X-DEP-INFO), École polytechnique (X), Universidade do Porto = University of Porto
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Zdroj: CCS
ACM CCS 2019-26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ACM CCS 2019-26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2019, London, United Kingdom. pp.63-78, ⟨10.1145/3319535.3354228⟩
Popis: We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain management protocol of Amazon Web Services' KMS (Key Management Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under standard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt development to date.
Manuel Barbosa was supported by grant SFRH/BSAB/143018/2018 awarded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT). Vitor Pereira was supported by grant FCT-PD/BD/113967/201 awarded by FCT. This work was partially funded by national funds via FCT in the context of project PTDC/CCI-INF/31698/2017.
Databáze: OpenAIRE