The Joint Effects of Supervisor Pay Transparency and Vertical Pay Dispersion on Reporting Honesty
| Autor: | Xiaotao Kelvin Liu, Yu Tian, Yue (May) Zhang |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Supervisor
ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION business.industry Transparency (market) media_common.quotation_subject Accounting Benchmarking Affect (psychology) Transparency (behavior) Microeconomics Honesty Secrecy Statistical dispersion Business Business and International Management media_common |
| Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| Popis: | We experimentally investigate how supervisor pay transparency interacts with vertical pay dispersion to affect subordinates' reporting honesty in a budgeting setting. We find that the effect of supervisor pay transparency relative to pay secrecy becomes more negative as vertical pay dispersion becomes higher. Our findings suggest that while supervisor pay transparency complements an egalitarian pay structure by increasing reporting honesty, it does not fare along with high vertical pay dispersion as the combination of the two appears to decrease reporting honesty, even when such high dispersion can be justified. Further investigation suggests that our result is not driven by the feeling of unfairness toward high supervisor pay, but by a benchmarking effect (i.e., subordinates use supervisor pay as a pay standard and try to find ways to earn a similar amount). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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