US State constitutional entrenchment and default in the 19th century

Autor:	Andrew T. Young, John A. Dove
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	Government media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0506 political science Empirical research State (polity) Order (business) Debt 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Economics 050207 economics General Economics Econometrics and Finance Law and economics media_common
Zdroj:	Journal of Institutional Economics. 15:963-982
ISSN:	1744-1382 1744-1374
Popis:	Constitutional scholars emphasize the importance of an enduring, stable constitutional order, which North and Weingast (1989) argue is consistent with credible commitments to sustainable fiscal policies. However, this view is controversial and has received little empirical study. We use 19th-century US state-level data to estimate relationships between constitutional design and the likelihood of a government default. Results indicate that more entrenched and less specific constitutions are associated with a lower likelihood of default.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f42b40fd379e9a3ac417fc4b5ed4711a https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137419000353 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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