Proffering Pork: How Party Leaders Build Party Reputations in Brazil

Autor:	Mona M. Lyne
Rok vydání:	2008
Předmět:	Sociology and Political Science media_common.quotation_subject Legislature Public administration Collective action Democracy Test (assessment) Scholarship Intervention (law) Incentive General theory Political economy Political science Political Science and International Relations media_common
Zdroj:	American Journal of Political Science. 52:290-303
ISSN:	1540-5907 0092-5853
Popis:	Despite its highly candidate-centered electoral law, recent studies have shown that Brazilian party leaders are more powerful, and Brazilian parties are more unified, than alleged by long-dominant scholarship. Examining post-War and contemporary democracy in Brazil, governed by the same federal legislative electoral law, this article provides a controlled test of the role of leadership and electoral law in driving party unity. The combination of leadership intervention to enforce unity, increased unity, and partisan tides in contemporary Brazil, in contrast to an absence of leadership intervention, lower unity, and no partisan tides in the post-War, provides strong support for the role of the leadership in generating unity, as emphasized in the collective action theory of party organization. The findings also suggest that a general theory of variation in party unity requires examining factors that lead to variation in party leaders' incentives to enforce unity, in addition to the current emphasis on backbenchers' incentives to defy the leadership.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e4e508db3237a622032bf511af964865 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00313.x Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text