Polynomial-time plaintext recovery attacks on the IKKR code-based cryptosystems
| Autor: | Terry Shue Chien Lau, Chik How Tan |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: |
Discrete mathematics
Post-quantum cryptography Algebra and Number Theory Computer Networks and Communications business.industry Applied Mathematics 020206 networking & telecommunications Plaintext Cryptography 0102 computer and information sciences 02 engineering and technology 01 natural sciences Microbiology law.invention 010201 computation theory & mathematics law McEliece cryptosystem Ciphertext 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics Cryptanalysis business Hamming weight BCH code Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Advances in Mathematics of Communications. 17:353-366 |
| ISSN: | 1930-5338 1930-5346 |
| Popis: | Recently, Ivanov et al. proposed a new approach to construct code-based cryptosystems, namely the \begin{document}$ {\sf IKKR} $\end{document} public-key encryptions (PKE) in the International Workshop on Code-Based Cryptography (CBCrypto 2020) [ 9 ]. Unlike the usual construction in code-based encryption schemes which has restrictions on the Hamming weight of the error introduced into the ciphertext, the \begin{document}$ {\sf IKKR} $\end{document} approach allows error vectors of arbitrary weight being introduced into the ciphertext. Using this new approach, Ivanov et al. constructed two cryptosystems, namely the modified and the upgraded \begin{document}$ {\sf IKKR} $\end{document} -PKE. This paper aims to discuss the practical security of the \begin{document}$ {\sf IKKR} $\end{document} -PKE. In particular, we describe the weaknesses in the design of the public key used in the \begin{document}$ {\sf IKKR} $\end{document} -PKE. We exploit such weaknesses and propose two attacks to recover the plaintext in the \begin{document}$ {\sf IKKR} $\end{document} -PKE. The approach of our first attack is similar to the LCKN attack [ 12 ], whilst our second attack is more efficient than the LCKN attack. Our experimental results show that we can recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext in less than 176 milliseconds for schemes based on random Goppa codes and BCH codes. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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