An economic analysis of Iranian petroleum contract

Autor:	Xiaoyi Mu, Fazel M. Farimani, Hamed Sahebhonar, Ali Taherifard
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Government media_common.quotation_subject Economic rent Energy Engineering and Power Technology Geology computer.file_format Geotechnical Engineering and Engineering Geology chemistry.chemical_compound Geophysics Fuel Technology chemistry Geochemistry and Petrology Cabinet (file format) Production (economics) Economic analysis Petroleum Economic Geology Profitability index Business Operating expense computer Industrial organization media_common
Zdroj:	Petroleum Science. 17:1451-1461
ISSN:	1995-8226 1672-5107
DOI:	10.1007/s12182-020-00486-2
Popis:	Following three generations of buyback contracts, the new model of Iranian petroleum contracts (IPC) was introduced by the Iranian cabinet to incentivize investments in the country. This paper analyzes the fiscal terms of the contract with technical information from one of the candidate fields for licensing. The financial simulation shows that, in general, the IPC resembles more a service contract than a production sharing contract as the contractor’s take is relatively low—below 5% across different scenarios of crude oil price. Second, the IPC is progressive in that as the overall profitability of the project improves the government takes an increasing share of the economic rent. The results are confirmed in a sensitivity analysis of each party’s profitability and takes on oil price, CAPEX, OPEX and the fee.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c83a20a1c5c5356ca01392463148055d https://doi.org/10.1007/s12182-020-00486-2 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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