| Popis: |
Property rights reformation of fishery resources in ecological hotspots has long been an essential part of international research in common-pool resource governance. In this article, we use the fishery resources of the Nanxi River in China as the research object. We adopt empirical and theoretical methods with a combination of original and secondary data to first systematically describe and analyze the history of property rights reformation in the Nanxi River over the past several decades. Second, we explore the complex reasons for the evolution of property rights reformation, especially its insufficiency and failures. The analysis of the complexity mainly consists of four aspects: the tragedy of the commons under free access; segment contracting under the shortage of institutional safeguards; entirety contracting at the expense of the benefits for ordinary fishers; and new segment contracting under the improvement of institutional arrangements. Moreover, we place emphasis on the analysis of the difference between the old and new segment contracting and the institutional improvement in new segment contracting. Finally, we conduct a systematic institutional optimization strategy in property rights reformations that fishery resources in Nanxi River or in China may face in the future. |
