Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
| Autor: | Gilad Bavly, Ron Peretz |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Discrete mathematics
Economics and Econometrics Finite-state machine Recall Punishment (psychology) 05 social sciences Contrast (statistics) 16. Peace & justice Bounded function 0502 economics and business Repeated game 050206 economic theory 050207 economics Folk theorem Set (psychology) Finance Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 115:131-145 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.003 |
| Popis: | We study repeated games in which each player i is restricted to (mixtures of) strategies that can recall up to k i stages of history. Characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs boils down to identifying the individually rational level (“punishment level”) of each player. In contrast to the classic folk theorem, in which players are unrestricted, punishing a bounded player may involve correlation between the punishers' actions. We show that the extent of such correlation is at most proportional to the ratio between the recall capacity of the punishers and the punishee. Our result extends to a few variations of the model, as well as to finite automata. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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