Board monitoring and covenant restrictiveness in private debt contracts during the global financial crisis
| Autor: | Arifur Khan, Paul R. Mather, George Tanewski, Intan Suryani Abu Bakar |
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| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
040101 forestry
050208 finance Delegate Ex-ante media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Financial system 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Covenant Independence Accounting Credit rationing Debt 0502 economics and business Financial crisis 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Business Restrictiveness Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Accounting & Finance. 60:661-692 |
| ISSN: | 1467-629X 0810-5391 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/acfi.12357 |
| Popis: | We examine the association between board independence and restrictiveness of covenants in U.S. private debt contracts around the global financial crisis (GFC). We show that board independence is associated with less restrictive covenants suggesting lenders willingness to delegate some monitoring of firms with independent boards. More nuanced analysis between the pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC periods shows mixed results and we suggest that, during the GFC and its aftermath, lenders place more emphasis on ex ante screening relative to ex post monitoring. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence on covenant use and lenders choices in periods of credit rationing. © 2018 AFAANZ |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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