Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Comment

Autor:	Robert H. Porter
Rok vydání:	2005
Předmět:	Microeconomics Punishment media_common.quotation_subject Industrial relations European integration Collusion Repeated game Cartel Economics Competition policy Industrial organization media_common
Zdroj:	Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. 5:231-234
ISSN:	1573-7012 1566-1679
DOI:	10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8
Popis:	This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8e5f57ee8fe45fa26ba5da93005328a5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF