Studying Naive Users and the Insider Threat with SimpleFlow
| Autor: | Ryan V. Johnson, Jessie Lass, W. Michael Petullo |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Computer science business.industry Internet privacy 0211 other engineering and technologies Insider threat Access control Linux kernel 02 engineering and technology computer.software_genre Security policy Computer security Filter (software) Information sensitivity 020204 information systems 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Malware business computer |
| Zdroj: | MIST@CCS |
| DOI: | 10.1145/2995959.2995960 |
| Popis: | Most access control systems prohibit illicit actions at the moment they seem to violate a security policy. While effective, such early action often clouds insight into the intentions behind negligent or willful security policy violations. Furthermore, existing control mechanisms are often very low-level; this hinders understanding because controls must be spread throughout a system. We propose SimpleFlow, a simple, information-flow-based access control system which allows illicit actions to occur up until sensitive information would have left the local network. SimpleFlow marks such illicit traffic before transmission, and this allows network devices to filter such traffic in a number of ways. SimpleFlow can also spoof intended recipients to trick malware into revealing application-layer communication messages even while blocking them. We have written SimpleFlow as a modification to the Linux kernel, and we have released our work as open source. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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