| Popis: |
Converting an interesting research idea into a profitable technology requires three principal components: a sound scientific base, proper integration with the relevant engineering, and a good marketing strategy. Some people would add luck. Underlying all this is high quality management at every stage of the process. But however favorable the initial signs, not all good ideas will be successful in the marketplace; for many techniques, their time will come (and go) as the economics of their competitors deteriorate (and improve). Applying these concepts to petroleum microbiology in a broad sense, how have some of the major projects in the field measured up? Look at three cases: Single-cell protein was certainly based on elegant science combined, in the course of time, with impressive engineering. Yet it has largely failed in the marketplace - economic conditions changed over a long incubation period as they so often do and the world view of food priorities was by no means the same in 1985 as it had been in the 1960s. Were managements at fault? Could they have done better? Or, consider the control of sulfate-reducing bacteria. Their biochemistry and physiology have been studied for decades and no doubt their genetics will soon be equally well mapped. The problems they pose are believed to be widespread in oil production, even critical to some operations. Biocides galore have been marketed. Yet still the problems are said to persist, more readily acknowledged by some operators than by others, preventative measures preferred in one case, remedial procedures, when necessary, in another. The market appears obvious and the science seems to be ready - but has it neglected to acquire a convincing engineering dimension? Have economic cost-benefits not been properly assessed? Have managements failed to take the steps needed actually to control souring? Or is the whole problem not really acute enough to be worth bothering about in the light, perhaps, of more serious difficulties confronted by producers? And what of MEOR? For close on half a century a band of stalwarts, now centered on one side of the Atlantic, now on the other, with offshoots at the ends of the earth, have battled away with very limited success to get their ideas adopted by the industry. The science is neither revolutionary nor contentious. But the engineering links are weak: few scientists working on MEOR seem to have been able to integrate well with qualified and experienced engineers. And of commercialization, there is hardly a breath: just a trace here and there. Is this, too, a management problem? Is dependence on government funding inevitable? Why does MEOR progress so slowly when some forms of innovation rapidly succeed by their own efforts? Questions like this have certainly been asked before [1] - perhaps some of the answers will emerge in this volume. |
