| Popis: |
Despite their differences in regime type, common themes emerge in the comparison of China and India. As oil importing countries, China and India sought energy security in 2000–2013 through NOC investments, but their NOCs were not always faithful in carrying out this mandate. Bureaucratic competition created an institutional landscape that encourages counterproductive NOC behavior, which undermines the national interest or NOCs’ own commercial viability. Bureaucratic competition and the autonomy it encourages for the agent can explain NOC behavior, such as keeping ministers and bureaucrats in the dark and competing against other NOCs from the same country for foreign assets. The dismantling of their respective energy ministries can be traced to priorities originating outside their respective energy sectors. This lends credibility to the conjecture that oil scarce countries are more likely to allow bureaucratic competition, since the leadership incentive to centralize oil revenues for political survival is absent. |
