The act of forgetting: Husserl on the constitution of the absent past
Autor: | Patrick Eldridge |
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Rok vydání: | 2020 |
Předmět: |
Cognitive science
Forgetting Constitution media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Phenomenology (philosophy) Philosophy 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Transcendental number Political philosophy Consciousness Psychology Privative media_common |
Zdroj: | Continental Philosophy Review. 53:401-417 |
ISSN: | 1573-1103 1387-2842 |
Popis: | I advance a phenomenology of forgetting based on Husserl’s accounts of time-consciousness and passive synthesis. This theory of forgetting is crucial for understanding the transcendental constitution of the past. I argue that without forgetting, neither memory nor retention suffice for a consciousness of the past as past, since both are irreducibly connected to the Living Present. After an initial survey of the challenges that confront a phenomenology of forgetting (i.e. the “forgotten” is defined by its lack of phenomenality), I provide a descriptive analysis of forgetting as a complex process that integrates an accomplishment of retention that Husserl called “temporal contraction” with an accomplishment of passive synthesis that Husserl called “affective fusion.” Temporal contraction is the accomplishment that creates a qualitative (not quantitative) distinction between near-retentions and far-retentions. Affective fusion enables us to provide a positive (not privative) phenomenological description of the withdrawal of egoic investment in intentional experiences. Taken together, these two syntheses generate a double concealment in which consciousness both forgets its object and forgets that it has forgotten it, thereby constituting it as part of the truly absent past. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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