Dispositions, states and causes
| Autor: | Robert C. Cummins |
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| Rok vydání: | 1974 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Analysis. 34:194-204 |
| ISSN: | 1467-8284 0003-2638 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/analys/34.6.194 |
| Popis: | IIN his book, A Materialist Theory of Mind, D. M. Armstrong advocates what he calls a 'realist' theory of dispositions (cf. pages 8 5-88). His position seems to be this: for a thing a to have a disposition d is for a to be in some state s which is causally responsible for any events which are manifestations of d in a, or which would be causally responsible for such events were there to be any. Armstrong holds in addition that the state s must, in principle anyway, be specifiable in non-dispositional terms, and in particular be specifiable independently of dispositional terms describing d. In the light of this, Armstrong advocates the identification of a particular disposition in a particular object (d in a) with the underlying state or 'categorical basis' (s) which is causally responsible for manifestations of that disposition in that object, and hence claims that dispositions are causes. A subsequent discussion in ANALYSIS did not lead Armstrong to modify his position substantially. Nevertheless, his position does need modification, though not for the reasons advanced by his critics. Indeed, we shall see that Armstrong has much the better ground, if not better arguments. In what follows, I shall argue that (i) dispositions are not causes, except in a derivative sense, (ii) there is no objection to identifying a disposition of a particular object with the underlying state, if any, and (iii) an object a's having a disposition d which can be acquired or lost by a does require that there be a nondispositionally specifiable state of a reference to which explains (would explain) manifestations of d by a. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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