Speaks’s Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem
| Autor: | Cody Gilmore, T. Scott Dixon |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Property (philosophy)
Reduction (recursion theory) Philosophy Green is 05 social sciences Proposition 06 humanities and the arts Arity 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Style (sociolinguistics) Argument 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Contingency |
| Zdroj: | Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 5:275-284 |
| ISSN: | 2161-2234 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/tht3.223 |
| Popis: | Speaks (2014) defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks’s theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2-adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore (1999) and King (2007), against the view that propositions are n-tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman (2013) against King’s view that propositions are facts of a special sort.We offer our argument as an objection to the view that propositions are unsaturated (non-0-adic) relations. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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