Free-rider effects in rent-seeking groups competing for public goods

Autor:	Edna T. Loehman, Emerson M. Babb, Fabrice N. Quesnel
Rok vydání:	1996
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Public economics Group (mathematics) media_common.quotation_subject Public good Individual risk Microeconomics Free rider problem Economics Rent-seeking Selection (genetic algorithm) media_common Public finance
Zdroj:	Public Choice. 86:35-61
ISSN:	1573-7101 0048-5829
DOI:	10.1007/bf00114874
Popis:	This paper studies individual behavior within a group when there is rent-seeking and groups compete in the selection of a public good — a variant of the traditional public goods problem. The situation is different from traditional public goods because an individual may not receive no reward for contribution to the group if the group does not win. Based on theory, the optimal contribution varies strategically depending on the characteristics of the situation, individual risk preferences, income, and subjective probability of winning.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2a554e7c32b516166b81984341120c5a https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00114874 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF