Pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries
| Autor: | Debashis Pal, Arup Bose, David E. M. Sappington |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics 020209 energy Strategy and Management 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) 02 engineering and technology ComputingMilieux_GENERAL Microeconomics Competition (economics) Incentive ComputerApplications_GENERAL 0502 economics and business Industrial relations 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Economics Profit margin 050207 economics Industrial organization Retail sector |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Industrial Organization. 51:162-184 |
| ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.004 |
| Popis: | We characterize the optimal access price and retail price for a vertically-integrated incumbent supplier (V) that faces limited competition from a new entrant in the retail sector. The optimal prices provide V with a relatively high wholesale profit margin and a relatively low retail profit margin. Consequently, V has no incentive to raise the costs of its retail rival. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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