Kant on Feelings, Sensations and the Gap Between Rationality and Morality

Autor:	Alexander Rueger
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Practical reason Philosophy Feeling Argument media_common.quotation_subject Metaphysics Hedonism Rationality Morality media_common Epistemology Pleasure
Zdroj:	Kantian Review. 25:125-148
ISSN:	2044-2394 1369-4154
Popis:	In §3 of the Critique of Judgement Kant argues that if the feeling of pleasure were a sensation distinct from whatever representation gives rise to the feeling, then we would be – in the terminology of the Metaphysics of Morals – rational beings (vernünftige Wesen) but not moral beings (Vernunftwesen); we would inescapably (and blamelessly) be hedonists. I reconstruct this at first glance strange argument and suggest, first, that Kant’s actual view of pleasure is an attitudinal theory that avoids the problem of hedonism. Second, the argument of §3 is to be understood in the context of Kant’s emphasis on moral feeling and its cultivation in his writings since the Critique of Practical Reason.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::16c0be60cb46d46b8d1c7778a3fdbe08 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415419000499 Zobrazit plný text záznamu