Endogenous and costly institutional deterrence

Autor:	Thomas C. Brown, David C. Kingsley
Rok vydání:	2014
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Central authority Earnings Public economics media_common.quotation_subject Institution Economics Deterrence theory Administrative cost Public good media_common
Zdroj:	Applied Economics Letters. 22:544-548
ISSN:	1466-4291 1350-4851
DOI:	10.1080/13504851.2014.955252
Popis:	Modern economies rely on central-authority institutions to regulate individual behaviour. Despite the importance of such institutions little is known about their formation within groups. In a public good experiment, groups selected the level of deterrence implemented by the institution, knowing that the administrative costs of the institution rose with the level of deterrence. Results suggest that groups readily self-impose costly deterrent formal institutions. The strictly deterrent institutions implemented here increased contributions sufficiently to completely offset the administrative cost and significantly increase earnings.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::143f4ac9041eb08b03de16e3495051f8 https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2014.955252 Zobrazit plný text záznamu