Strategies of Repression
Autor: | Fiona Shen-Bayh |
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Rok vydání: | 2018 |
Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Sociology and Political Science Punishment media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Autocracy 0506 political science Original data Politics State (polity) Political science Political Science and International Relations Elite 050602 political science & public administration Psychological repression Law and economics media_common |
Zdroj: | World Politics. 70:321-357 |
ISSN: | 1086-3338 0043-8871 |
Popis: | Strategies of repression vary widely between extrajudicial and judicial extremes, from unrestrained acts of violence to highly routinized legal procedures. While the former have received a great deal of scholarly attention, judicial methods remain relatively understudied. When and why do rulers repress their rivals in court? The author argues that autocrats use a judicial strategy of repression when confronting challengers from within the ruling elite. Unlike regime outsiders, who pose a common, external threat to mobilize against, insiders present a more divisive target. When autocrats confront the latter, a judicial strategy legitimizes punishment, deters future rivals, and generates shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, the author finds that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders. A case study of Kenya traces the logic of the theory, showing how intraregime conflict made courts a valuable instrument of state repression. The findings demonstrate how courts can play a central role in autocratic survival. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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