The unique hues and the argument from phenomenal structure
| Autor: | Wayne Wright |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy 05 social sciences Metaphysics 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Unique hues Epistemology Philosophy of language Eliminative materialism Argument 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Realism Hue |
| Zdroj: | Philosophical Studies. 176:1513-1533 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0883 0031-8116 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-018-1076-9 |
| Popis: | Hardin’s (Color for philosophers: unweaving the rainbow, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1988) empirically-grounded argument for color eliminativism has defined the color realism debate for the last 30 years. By Hardin’s own estimation, phenomenal structure—the unique/binary hue distinction in particular—poses the greatest problem for color realism. Examination of relevant empirical findings shows that claims about the unique hues which play a central role in the argument from phenomenal structure should be rejected. Chiefly, contrary to widespread belief amongst philosophers and scientists, the unique hues do not play a fundamental role in determining all color appearances. Among the consequences of this result is that greater attention should be paid to certain proposals for putting the structure of phenomenal color into principled correspondence with surface reflectance properties. While color realism is not fully vindicated, it has much greater empirical plausibility than previously thought. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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