Taking Pleasure in the Good and Well-Being: the Harmless Pleasures Objection
| Autor: | James J. Delaney |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of science Philosophy media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Counterintuitive Subject (philosophy) 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Pleasure 060302 philosophy Criticism Hedonism 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Form of the Good media_common |
| Zdroj: | Philosophia. 46:281-294 |
| ISSN: | 1574-9274 0048-3893 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11406-017-9903-3 |
| Popis: | Well-being is that which is non-instrumentally good for a person. It is identical to how well someone's life goes. There are three main theories of well-being: hedonism, desire-fulfillment, and objective list theories. Each of these theories is subject to criticism, which has led some philosophers to posit a hybrid theory in which well-being is defined as taking pleasure in objective goods. One problem that comes with such an account is the possibility of what I will call harmless pleasures; that is, pleasures that while not taken in something bad, are neither linked to objective goods. It is counterintuitive to say that such pleasures do not make a person's life go better, yet this seems to be what hybrid theories entail. I call this the harmless-pleasure objection. In this paper, I argue that there is no obvious solution to this objection and this result casts doubt on hybrid theories of well-being. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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