Equivalence of auctions and posted prices

Autor:	Kultti, K.K.
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	1999
Předmět:	TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS Auctions posted prices random matching jel:C73 TheoryofComputation_GENERAL jel:C78 jel:D44
Zdroj:	Games and Economic Behavior, 27(1), 106-113. Academic Press Inc.
ISSN:	0899-8256
Popis:	We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices. Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent. Previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets. Posted price market dominate bargaining markets similarly.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::703a03e0c8221514d867471350005560 https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/ec5a7b2a-bad3-4702-aa7d-bf8347cdc4ca Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect