Do people share opportunities?

Autor: Belhaj, Mohamed, Deroïan, Frédéric, Faure, Mathieu
Přispěvatelé: Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011), ANR-18-CE26-0020,MaRiNe,Gestion du Risque sur les Réseaux(2018), Lhuillier, Elisabeth, Aix-Marseille School of Economics - - AMSE (EUR)2017 - ANR-17-EURE-0020 - EURE - VALID, INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE - - Amidex2011 - ANR-11-IDEX-0001 - IDEX - VALID, APPEL À PROJETS GÉNÉRIQUE 2018 - Gestion du Risque sur les Réseaux - - MaRiNe2018 - ANR-18-CE26-0020 - AAPG2018 - VALID
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2022
Předmět:
Popis: A set of agents is aware of the existence of an economic opportunity, and compete for the associated prize. We study incentives to communicate about the existence of this economic opportunity to uninformed agents when the winner of the prize shares it with others, through some exogenous sharing rule. Communicating about the opportunity has two conflicting effects: it increases competition, but it can also increase the likelihood of receiving a large share of the prize. We find that, for any sharing rule, there is a minimum equilibrium, which Pareto dominates all other equilibria. We also find that under bilaterally symmetric sharing, more sharing generates more communication. We then discuss these results along several extensions.
Databáze: OpenAIRE