Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism
| Autor: | Pérez-Castrillo, David, Ferenc, Veszteg Róbert, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica, Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
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| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname |
| Popis: | Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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