| Abstrakt: |
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, litigants and scholars have begun to argue that laws meant to prevent housing discrimination are takings under the Fifth Amendment. This theory of property law, if recognized by the courts, would provide expansive and unprecedented power to private property owners to discriminate against others and hamstring the government's power to protect its citizens. Plaintiffs in a recent lawsuit, Yim v. City of Seattle, advanced this very argument in protest of Seattle's renter protection laws. While their petition for certiorari was denied in 2024, Yim may be a harbinger of future legal actions that seek to allow discriminatory behavior under the veil of Fifth Amendment protections. This Note makes four arguments as to why such an interpretation of the Takings Clause is inappropriate. First, there is a powerful originalist case against regulatory takings that suggests the Court erred when expanding regulatory takings in cases like Cedar Point and Penn Central Transportation. Second, existing doctrine is clear that antidiscrimination legislation is distinguished from physical takings and does not amount to regulatory takings requiring compensation. Third, Heart of Atlanta Motel remains good law and supports the argument that takings cannot be used to reward a property owner's prejudiced or discriminatory practices when they advertise their property to the public. Finally, the extension of the takings doctrine contemplated here is contrary to the goals of government and the constraints of living in a multicultural society. The rights of property owners are not absolute, and the choice to rent property to the public necessarily comes with restrictions. The Note concludes that antidiscrimination housing regulations are not takings under the law as it exists now, nor is it desirable to change the interpretation of the takings doctrine to reward discriminatory housing practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
