| Abstrakt: |
By accepting the role of human will in accepting and forming, maintaining, and using beliefforming procedures, John Heil emphasizes the responsibility of man towards beliefs. Despite Heil’s defense of indirect doxastic voluntarism, he follows a graded process from the directness of the will’s role in the procedure of forming and maintaining belief to the indirect influence of accepting and forming belief. In the formation of beliefs, Heil does not accept the direct will to believe, which is based on the famous idea of Cartesian. However, by distinguishing between direct doxastic voluntarism and indirect doxastic voluntarism, explaining the concept of basic and non-basic acts, and expressing procedures and techniques such as behavioral change, he tries to interpret the acceptance and formation of beliefs under the voluntary but indirect control of people. In this research, by using the analytical-critical method, we aim to show that by modifying Heil’s view, accepting epistemic responsibility based on the view of indirect doxastic voluntarism is meaningful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
