| Autor: |
Mountford, Thomas, Dhavlle, Abhijitt, Tevebaugh, Andrew, Mansoor, Naseef, Dinakarrao, Sai Manoj Pudukotai, Ganguly, Amlan |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Journal of Low Power Electronics & Applications; Sep2023, Vol. 13 Issue 3, p50, 15p |
| Abstrakt: |
In modern computing, which relies on the interconnection of networks used in many/multi-core systems, any system can be critically subverted if the interconnection is compromised. This can be done in a multitude of ways, but the threat of a hardware Trojan (HT) being injected into a system is particularly prevalent due to the increase in third-party manufacturers for system-on-chip (SoC) designs. With a local injection of an HT in an SoC, an adversary can gain access to information about applications running on the system by revealing specific communications of the SoC, and the network-on-chip (NoC) as a whole. This heavily compromises the system and gives information to the attacker, which can lead to more tailored, compromising attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate an HT that exploits communication patterns inside an SoC to reveal applications that are running on an NoC with multi/many-core processors. This is performed by leaking packet counts, after which the attacker then uses machine learning techniques to identify applications running on processors, and the SoC as a whole. We also propose a LUT-based obfuscation technique to limit the information available to the hardware Trojan. Our results indicate that this obfuscation method can reduce the accuracy of this attack from 99% to <8% in multi/many-core systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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