| Abstrakt: |
The intersection between autonomous weapon systems ('AWS') and non-State armed groups ('NSAG') is an underexplored aspect of the AWS debate. This article explores the main ways future policymakers can reduce the risk of NSAGs committing violations of the laws of armed conflict ('LOAC') using AWS once the technology becomes more prolific and easily distributable. It does this by sketching a chronological picture of an NSAG's weapons obtention process, looking first at its likely suppliers and transport routes (acquisition), and, subsequently, at factors which can increase the risk of LOAC violations once the system is in their possession (use). With regard to use, we find that the lack of explicit legal obligations in LOAC to (a) review weapons meant solely for transfer and (b) provide technical training to recipients of transfer constitute serious reasons why LOAC violations may be aggravated with the introduction of AWS to insurgent groups. We also find, however, that States are uniquely and powerfully placed to address both acquisition and use factors, and outline how they can be persuaded into implementing the risk-reducing measures recommended in this article for purely strategic reasons, i.e., even if they express no interest in improving LOAC compliance per se. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
