Limits to Bureaucratic Growth: The Density Dependence of Organizational Rule Births.

Autor: Schulz, Martin
Předmět:
Zdroj: Administrative Science Quarterly; Dec98, Vol. 43 Issue 4, p845-876, 32p, 2 Diagrams, 5 Charts
Abstrakt: The study reported here uses a population ecology approach to examine whether bureaucratic rules breed more rules. Hypotheses about the birth rate of bureaucratic rules are derived and tested with time series data on rule production in a large U.S. research university. Results show that the rate of rule production declines with the number of rules in a rule population over time. The results support organizational learning theories: by expanding the number of rules, organizations increasingly respond to environmental challenges in a programmed way, reducing organizational experiences with new situations, inhibiting organizational learning, and thereby eliminating a main impetus for making more rules. Radical bureaucratization theories, however, are not supported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Databáze: Complementary Index
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