| Autor: |
Hauert C; Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver B.C. V6T 1Z2, Canada.; Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver B.C. V6T 1Z4, Canada., McAvoy A; School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA.; Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. |
| Abstrakt: |
When individuals interact in groups, the evolution of cooperation is traditionally modelled using the framework of public goods games. These models often assume that the return of the public goods depends linearly on the fraction of contributors. In contrast, in real-life public goods interactions, the return can depend on the size of the investor pool as well. Here, we consider a model in which the multiplication factor (marginal per capita return) for the public goods depends linearly on how many contribute, which results in a nonlinear model of public goods. This simple model breaks the curse of dominant defection found in linear public goods interactions and gives rise to richer dynamical outcomes in evolutionary settings. We provide an in-depth analysis of the more varied decisions by the classical rational player in nonlinear public goods interactions as well as a mechanistic, microscopic derivation of the evolutionary outcomes for the stochastic dynamics in finite populations and in the deterministic limit of infinite populations. This kind of nonlinearity provides a natural way to model public goods with diminishing returns as well as economies of scale. |
