When do stereotypes undermine indirect reciprocity?

Autor: Kawakatsu M; Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America.; Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America., Michel-Mata S; Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America., Kessinger TA; Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America., Tarnita CE; Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America., Plotkin JB; Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America.; Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: PLoS computational biology [PLoS Comput Biol] 2024 Mar 01; Vol. 20 (3), pp. e1011862. Date of Electronic Publication: 2024 Mar 01 (Print Publication: 2024).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011862
Abstrakt: Social reputations provide a powerful mechanism to stimulate human cooperation, but observing individual reputations can be cognitively costly. To ease this burden, people may rely on proxies such as stereotypes, or generalized reputations assigned to groups. Such stereotypes are less accurate than individual reputations, and so they could disrupt the positive feedback between altruistic behavior and social standing, undermining cooperation. How do stereotypes impact cooperation by indirect reciprocity? We develop a theoretical model of group-structured populations in which individuals are assigned either individual reputations based on their own actions or stereotyped reputations based on their groups' behavior. We find that using stereotypes can produce either more or less cooperation than using individual reputations, depending on how widely reputations are shared. Deleterious outcomes can arise when individuals adapt their propensity to stereotype. Stereotyping behavior can spread and can be difficult to displace, even when it compromises collective cooperation and even though it makes a population vulnerable to invasion by defectors. We discuss the implications of our results for the prevalence of stereotyping and for reputation-based cooperation in structured populations.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
(Copyright: © 2024 Kawakatsu et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.)
Databáze: MEDLINE
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