Game-theoretic algorithm for interdependent infrastructure network restoration in a decentralized environment.

Autor: Rangrazjeddi A; School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, USA., González AD; School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, USA., Barker K; School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, USA.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis [Risk Anal] 2024 Jul; Vol. 44 (7), pp. 1630-1650. Date of Electronic Publication: 2024 Jan 04.
DOI: 10.1111/risa.14269
Abstrakt: Having reliable interdependent infrastructure networks is vital for well-being of a safe and productive society. Systems are vulnerable to failure or performance loss due to their interdependence among various networks, as each failure can propagate through the whole system. Although the conventional view has concentrated on optimizing the restoration of critical interdependent infrastructure networks using a centralized approach, having a lone actor as a decision-maker in the system is substantially different from the actual restoration decision environment, wherein infrastructure utilities make their own decisions about how to restore their network service. In a decentralized environment, the definition of whole system optimality does not apply as each decision-maker's interest may not converge with the others. Subsequently, this results in each decision-maker developing its own reward functions. Therefore, in this study, we address the concern of having multiple decision-makers with various payoff functions in interdependent networks by proposing a decentralized game theory algorithm for finding Nash equilibria solutions for network restoration in postdisaster situations.
(© 2024 Society for Risk Analysis.)
Databáze: MEDLINE
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