Decisional Capacity: Two Philosophical Issues.
| Autor: | Brudney D; Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the College; Associate Faculty in the Divinity School; Associate Faculty, MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics; and Florin Harrison Pugh Professor at the University of Chicago in Chicago, Illinois USA. dbrudney@uchicago.edu. |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Zdroj: | The Journal of clinical ethics [J Clin Ethics] 2022 Winter; Vol. 33 (4), pp. 333-346. |
| Abstrakt: | In this article I note two ways in which current assessments of patients' decisional capacity rest on disputable philosophical assumptions. The first disputable assumption concerns the nature of practical reason; the second concerns patients' articulation of their preferences. I do not argue that clinical practice should be changed. Still, relying on disputable philosophical assumptions can distort the description of such practice. It would be good for philosophers and philosophically oriented clinicians to work with a philosophically accurate account of clinical practice. Moreover, every so often more accurate description might make for better practice. (Copyright 2022 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.) |
| Databáze: | MEDLINE |
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