| Abstrakt: |
The world in which our reality is to be set up, needs to be organized. Knowledge of this world is not acquired just by experience but by complex relation between what was lived, and discourses, whether preceding or ensuing experience, that render it both signifying and articulate. In other words, knowledge is not possible in the absence of a discourse that warrants and organizes perception. And, it is the institutive discourse of another human by which the mode of relation with the world that implies organizations and valuations is made possible. A discourse is called into play that not only organizes and marks the limits but also institutes identities, which can only be accomplished by means of differentiation. The other human, however, does not only transmit the adaptative, but also the "unadapted" of the species: the neurotic inscriptions of the lived reality, the generational experiences that account for the constitution of those that took the child into their care, the judgements and prejudices that appear as irreducible, operating as limited blocks that experience is unable to dissolve, and can even transform the prejudiced object in that that was previously imposed as its dominant trait. The present work endeavours to make a distinction between belief and prejudice, by addressing the question both from the epistemological and the psychodynamic angles, with due attention to the ethical and moral implications of such distinction. |
