Mixing economic and administrative instruments: the case of shrimp aquaculture in ThailandThe authors would like to thank the Government of Thailand and the Asian Development Bank for supporting much of the analysis underlying this paper. Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. Tongroj Onchan and Clive Mason, who directed the project. The helpful comments of two reviewers are also gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in the paper are, however, solely those of the authors.

Autor: RANDALL A. BLUFFSTONE1, DARARATT ANANTANASUWONG2, IVAN RUZICKA3
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Zdroj: Environment & Development Economics. Oct2006, Vol. 11 Issue 5, p651-667. 17p.
Abstrakt: Economic instruments offer the potential to reach pre-determined environmental goals at a lower aggregate cost than less incentive-based measures, but administrative underpinnings crucial to the effective functioning of economic instruments may be lacking in developing countries. For this reason, pragmatic analysts and policymakers often advocate the use of so-called ‘mixed’ instruments that combine incentive mechanisms with improved administrative arrangements. This paper explores such possibilities with reference to intensive shrimp aquaculture, which dominates shrimp farming and is an important economic sector in Thailand. This activity has been cited as a major contributor to environmental degradation in Thailand and several other countries through destruction of mangrove forests, salinization of land, sludge disposal, and, in particular, water pollution. An analytical model is presented that highlights some of the key opportunities and limitations of mixed instruments applied to shrimp aquaculture. Mixed instruments are then proposed and evaluated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Databáze: GreenFILE