Zobrazeno 1 - 6
of 6
pro vyhledávání: '"venture game"'
Autor:
Diego Gambetta, Wojtek Przepiorka
Publikováno v:
Sociological Science, Vol 6, Iss 14, Pp 352-379 (2019)
Well-enforced norms create an opportunity for norm breakers to cooperate in ventures requiring trust. This is realized when norm breakers, by sharing evidence of their breaches, make themselves vulnerable to denunciation and therefore trustworthy. Th
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/60f8a25dcabf4e6d92bab35eaa48604b
Publikováno v:
Operations Research Letters, 48(1), 55-60. Elsevier
van den Brink, R, Levínský, R & Zelený, M 2020, ' The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures ', Operations Research Letters, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 55-60 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003
van den Brink, R, Levínský, R & Zelený, M 2020, ' The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures ', Operations Research Letters, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 55-60 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003
In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the Shapley value and the Proper Shapley value. We characterize positive Proper Shapley values by affine invariance and by an axiom that requires proportional a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b91a85a555b5b43faba44e69d5afe14b
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/16df7b51-66db-438a-a363-0171af3601b1
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/16df7b51-66db-438a-a363-0171af3601b1
Publikováno v:
van den Brink, R, Levinsky, R & Zeleny, M 2018 ' The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures ' TI Discussion Paper Series, vol. 18-089/II, Tinbergen Institute . < http://papers.tinbergen.nl/18089.pdf >
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Moulin (1987) studies the equal and proportional sharing rule for a special class of cooperative games that he calls joint venture games. Proportionality is an important principle in allocation problems. Besides some special cases, it is not obvious
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::a8a752ef654b2d8435730a83174a9509
https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/f50e2435-bec2-4026-a0ce-a5595f5e02b7
https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/f50e2435-bec2-4026-a0ce-a5595f5e02b7
Autor:
Gambetta, Diego, Przepiorka, W., Leerstoel Buskens, Social Networks, Solidarity and Inequality
Publikováno v:
Sociological Science, Vol 6, Iss 14, Pp 352-379 (2019)
Sociological Science, 6, 352. Society for Sociological Science
Sociological Science, 6, 352. Society for Sociological Science
Well-enforced norms create an opportunity for norm breakers to cooperate in ventures requiring trust. This is realized when norm breakers, by sharing evidence of their breaches, make themselves vulnerable to denunciation and therefore trustworthy. Th
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