Zobrazeno 1 - 5
of 5
pro vyhledávání: '"tax migration"'
Autor:
Kakaulina, Maria O.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Tax Reform; Том 3, № 2 (2017); 103-114
The article examines the problem of Laffer curve visualization. The purpose of the article is to propose a visual representation of the curve that takes into account the effects of capital outflow. The following research methods were used in the cour
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=urfujournals::a321283307c981bc99b5b8cf48c56dab
https://journals.urfu.ru/index.php/jtr/article/view/2693
https://journals.urfu.ru/index.php/jtr/article/view/2693
Autor:
Maria O. Kakaulina
Статья посвящена проблеме визуализации кривой Лаффера. Её целью является предложение варианта визуализации кривой с учетом последстви
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fb6fe9a7c7c4fb9945c2f94bea632886
https://hdl.handle.net/10995/61865
https://hdl.handle.net/10995/61865
Autor:
Kakaulina, M. O.
20.03.2017 The paper deals with the problem of graphical representation of the Laffer curve. The aim of this article is to develop a graphical interpretation of the Laffer curve, taking into account the tax «migration» process. In the course of the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______917::71142e6c210d7534cba4e0717053d9b7
https://hdl.handle.net/10995/55433
https://hdl.handle.net/10995/55433
Autor:
Vilen Lipatov, Alfons Weichenrieder
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal- taxation model with two skill levels and analyze a symmetric subgame- perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::586c0caf95183456e50c5ff53aa0f072
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/WP1207.pdf
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/WP1207.pdf
Autor:
Vilen Lipatov, Alfons J. Weichenrieder
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0ed7dfd5f8f96b9bba6c547b2d9b4495
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1634792
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1634792