Performance measurement, expectancy and agency theory: an experimental study

Autor: Sloof, Randolph, Praag, Mirjam van

Publikováno v: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 3-4, 794-809

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in

Externí odkaz: http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/26311

Combining 'Real Effort' with Induced Effort Costs: The Ball-Catching Task

Autor: Gächter, Simon, Huang, Lingbo, Sefton, Martin

We introduce the "ball-catching task", a novel computerized real effort task, which combines "real" efforts with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of ef

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::1f71923d979aff294061681e124c5d33
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110768

Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company

Autor: Montmarquette, Claude, Rullière, Jean-Louis, Villeval, Marie Claire, Zeiliger, Romain

Publikováno v: Economic Science Association Conference
Economic Science Association Conference, Jun 2003, Pittsburgh, United States
European Association of Labour Economists Conference
European Association of Labour Economists Conference, Sep 2003, Sevilla, Spain
Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics
Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, Jul 2003, Lake Tahoe, United States
Journées de Micro-Economie Appliquée
Journées de Micro-Economie Appliquée, Jun 2003, Montpellier, France
ESRC Conference on Pay, Incentives and Performance
ESRC Conference on Pay, Incentives and Performance, Apr 2003, Bristol, United Kingdom
Economic Science Association
Economic Science Association, Sep 2002, Strasbourg, France

After a merger, company officials face the challenge to uniform compensation schemes and to redesign teams with managers originating from different incentives and working habits. In this paper, we offer a new way to investigate in post-merger the rel

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::1ab0de309745afbd730047eead811044
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00176841

Gender differences and dynamics in competition: The role of luck

Autor: David Gill, Victoria Prowse

We present experimental evidence which sheds new light on why women may be less competitive than men. Specifically, we observe striking differences in how men and women respond to good and bad luck in a competitive environment. Following a loss, wome

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::75d3d760736713640bf7543552d8c245
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36964

Performance measurement, expectancy and agency theory: an experimental study

Autor: Sloof, Randolph, van Praag, C. Mirjam

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in th

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::52ae54e6268a76874359769a473fcde2
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/34667