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pro vyhledávání: '"multi-object allocation"'
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 1161:1-46
We consider the economy consisting of n agents and m heterogenous objects where the seller benefits v from objects. Our study focuses on the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-dem
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::1b5c386dcfbd399d01ec56b1952024e3
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/87619
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/87619
Autor:
Sakai, Ryosuke, Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 1134:1-21
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extendi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::1f8d932b76e139f39ae4256a813229b6
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81854
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81854
Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 1001:1-55
May 2017. Revised January 2020
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::821f97249df266a8c68eda35b26fbbd6
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61274
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61274
Autor:
Sakai, Ryosuke, Serizawa, Shigehiro
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-waste fulness, equal treatment of equals, and strat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::a8cc326c4aa7edadf4e2008f885e1629
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234919
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234919
